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Abstract
Morishita’s ‘‘multiple analysis’’ of the whaling issue [Morishita J. Multiple analysis of the whaling issue: Understanding the dispute by
a matrix. Marine Policy 2006;30:802–8] is essentially a restatement of the Government of Japan’s whaling policy, which confuses the issue
through selective use of data, unsubstantiated facts, and the vilification of opposing perspectives. Here, we deconstruct the major
problems with Morishita’s article and provide an alternative view of the whaling dispute. For many people in this debate, the issue is not
that some whales are not abundant, but that the whaling industry cannot be trusted to regulate itself or to honestly assess the status of
potentially exploitable populations. This suspicion has its origin in Japan’s poor use of science, its often implausible stock assessments, its
insistence that culling is an appropriate way to manage marine mammal populations, and its relatively recent falsification of whaling and
fisheries catch data combined with a refusal to accept true transparency in catch and market monitoring. Japanese policy on whaling
cannot be viewed in isolation, but is part of a larger framework involving a perceived right to secure unlimited access to global marine
resources. Whaling is inextricably tied to the international fisheries agreements on which Japan is strongly dependent; thus, concessions
made at the IWC would have potentially serious ramifications in other fora.
r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In an article that purports to offer a multiple analysis
view of the whaling dispute, Joji Morishita [1] gives the
Government of Japan’s (GOJ) position on whaling as if it
were incontestable fact. Morishita’s article is in some
respects a useful exposition of the elements of the whaling
debate and of the changing political environment within
the International whaling commission (IWC) from the
1960s to the present day. However, by selectively choosing
the information he presents, ignoring contradictory data,
providing ‘‘facts’’ supported by irrelevant citations, trivia-
lizing opposing perspectives, and vilifying opponents,
Morishita succeeds in creating a discussion of the issue
which is in fact nothing more than a one-sided restatement
of the GOJ’s whaling policy.
Such casuistry is wearyingly familiar to those of us in the
IWC’s Scientific Committee (SC), where Japan has
unsuccessfully attempted to gain endorsement of some
very poor science that is in reality just a front for the
continued exploitation of whale stocks while the Morator-
ium on commercial whaling remains in place [2]. Since
1987, Japan has killed almost 10,000 whales in its two
scientific whaling programs in the Antarctic and North
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Pacific; this is more than four and a half times the total
number killed for research by all other nations combined
since 1952.1 In addition, as we note at the conclusion of this
response, there is much more at stake for Japan on the
whaling issue than the catching of whales.
In his Introduction, Morishita complains, ‘‘Confusion
and intentional misuse of arguments are exacerbating the
whaling dispute.’’ This is certainly true, but Morishita and
the GOJ are themselves frequently guilty of these tactics.
For example, the author correctly remarks that the blanket
statement ‘‘whales are endangered’’ is misleading in light of
the widely differing conservation status of the many species
of cetaceans, and labels such simplifications as ‘‘simply
preposterous’’. However, no reputable scientist associated
with the SC has ever made such a statement. In contrast,
we note that Japan frequently promulgates generalizations
regarding all aspects of the whaling dispute. For example,
the GOJ often states publicly that ‘‘whales’’ consume too
much fish. Indeed, in his article (p. 804) Morishita ignores
his own admonition about generalization and says, ‘‘When
stomach contents were analyzed as part of scientific
whaling programs, it was found that baleen whales eat a
large amount of commercially important fish.’’
This simplistic statement obscures the complexity of this
topic and ignores several key ecological facts:
 Many whales do not eat fish at all; indeed, the greatest
biomass of the world’s baleen whales live in the
Southern Hemisphere, where they primarily consume
krill [3].2
 The sizes of many whale populations today are at a
small fraction of their levels in pre-whaling times when
commercial fish populations were considerably larger
and much healthier than they are today [3,4].
 The primary predators of fish are not whales, but other
fish [5].
 The removal of top predators (such as cetaceans) can
cause major ecosystem perturbations, with negative
consequences for fisheries [6].
 Human over-fishing (not whales) is the cause of the
precipitous decline of commercial fish stocks worldwide
[7].
These points have been made repeatedly in various
publications and fora, yet Japan continues to promote the
idea of competition by and among whale species as the
primary justification for its scientific whaling [8,9]. The
cynics at IWC have little doubt that Japan had already
decided what the results of its research would be long before
the first ships left the dock: that whales are abundant and
increasing, and since Japanese researchers will inevitably
find fish or krill in their stomachs, that whales must be out-
competing both humans and each other for fisheries
resources. This conclusion, which is simplistic and ecologi-
cally flawed [5,10], is lent false credence by Japan’s use of
ecosystem models. Such models are mathematically dense
(and thus are conveniently opaque to non-specialists), but
are typically forced to ignore or vastly oversimplify input
parameters due to lack of data on numerous ecosystem
variables. Consequently, they can provide, at best, only
primitive representations of the immensely complex and
dynamic marine ecosystems of which whales constitute but
one element. Indeed, the SC has concluded, ‘‘There is
currently no system for which we have suitable data or
modeling approaches to be able to provide reliable
quantitative management advice on the impact of cetaceans
on fisheries or fisheries on cetaceans’’ [11].
The implication of the competition argument is that
abundant whales must be ‘‘managed’’ (i.e. culled) to
protect human food security, or to selectively promote
the recovery of particularly depleted but commercially
valuable species such as the blue whale [8,9]. Yet culling is
not only a crude and ineffective method of managing
animals in a complex ecosystem, it is antithetical to the
objectives of the International Convention for the Regula-
tion of Whaling, and the conservative principles underlying
the SC’s agreed method of calculating catch quotas, the
Revised Management Procedure (RMP).
Morishita’s contention that the IWC ‘‘clearly acknowl-
edge(s) the scientific contributions of (Japan’s) research’’ is
belied by repeated critiques from numerous SC scientists
[2,12]. These critiques have pointed out that Japan’s
research has little relevance to the input variables required
by the RMP, and that the questions concerned could be
addressed more cheaply and effectively using non-lethal
methods (and indeed are in many other international
research programs). When 63 members of the SC
(representing more than half of the national delegations
present) come to this conclusion [13], it can hardly be called
a ringing endorsement of Japan’s research.
In the article, Morishita states or implies that (high)
abundance estimates are frequently agreed upon by IWC,
when in reality many of these involve considerable scientific
uncertainty and debate. As one example, the GOJ has
repeatedly given an estimate of abundance that has
humpback whales increasing by almost 17,000 animals,
or more than 100% (from 16,211 to 33,010) in temporally
adjacent surveys in the IWC’s Antarctic management zone
known as Area IV [14]. This implausible increase (which is
used to support an argument that humpbacks are now out-
competing minke whales) is explained by ‘‘distributional
shifts’’, although there are no data from the Antarctic or
anywhere else to support the occurrence of such a vast and
ARTICLE IN PRESS
1As of April 2006, since 1987 Japan had killed 8973 minke whales, 293
Bryde’s whales, 240 sei whales, 43 sperm whales, and 10 fin whales (total
9559 animals). The total catch by all other countries from 1952 to 2006
(including Japan) is approximately 2100 whales. Prior to the IWC
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(source: IWC).
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baleen whales migrate in winter to mate and calve, but where they do not
feed at all.
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unprecedented change in habitat use by so many whales
over any time period, let alone 2 years.3 This is only one
example of the poor science emanating from Japan’s
scientific whaling programs, and the GOJ’s insistence that
the SC accept such numbers as real in the face of the most
basic scientific common sense betrays the bias and political
motivation that underlies its whale research.
Morishita also informs readers (in a statement relegated
to a footnote) that an abundance estimate of 760,000 for
Antarctic minke whales was ‘‘agreed’’ by the SC in 1990,
but adds that this number ‘‘is currently under review
because of new data accumulated since that time’’. The
parenthetical nature of the wording here obscures the
tremendous controversy in this debate. The 760,000 figure
came from a decadal set of circumpolar surveys finalized in
1987/88, and included an estimate of the substantial
uncertainty around this number. The current analyses
from a further set of surveys through the 1990s are
suggesting greatly reduced abundance of minke whales,
with some predicting a reduction from the earlier point
estimate of as much as 65% to 268,000 animals [16].
Indeed, the SC agreed in 2000 that the 760,000 number was
no longer appropriate [17], and there has been no
resolution of this issue in the past six IWC meetings. To
many SC members, the huge discrepancies between the two
estimates suggest either an unprecedented decline in the
population of minke whales, or that the surveys from
which such estimates are derived yield fundamentally
unreliable results. Either way, Morishita’s obscure render-
ing of this issue is typical of the manner in which the GOJ
ignores or trivializes scientific data and debates that do not
support its positions.
Note that the GOJ carefully adjusts the level of its
misinformation to the target readership; what is said in
journal articles read by scientists is typically far more
cautious than the ‘‘facts’’ promulgated to a lay audience.
For example, Morishita is careful in his article to note that
some whale populations are growing ‘‘at more than 10%
annually’’, yet on the public website of the GOJ’s Institute
of Cetacean Research (ICR)4 (www.icrwhale.org), readers
are told that populations of humpback and fin whales are
increasing at ‘‘14–16%’’—rates that the SC has agreed are
biologically impossible.5 Elsewhere, the 760,000 estimate
for Antarctic minke whales is often cited by Japan with no
mention of the fact that the IWC no longer considers it
appropriate.
In another case of incomplete narrative, Morishita goes
on to say that application of the RMP to Southern
Hemisphere minke whales would allow catches of ‘‘at least
2000 animals for the next 100 years without posing adverse
effects on the stock’’. First, this calculation is contingent
upon the much-contested abundance estimate of 760,000
noted above, and would also require currently unavailable
data on the manner in which the populations of Antarctic
minke whales are divided around their circumpolar dis-
tribution. Second, application of a circumpolar abundance
estimate is not applicable to the Japanese whaling effort,
which has occurred in only a portion of the Antarctic. What
he also fails to mention is that if the RMP were applied to
Japan’s scientific whaling catches in the North Pacific, the
current takes—notably of minke whales in Japanese coastal
waters—would likely be well above what would be
authorized by this procedure. Furthermore, the proposed
Japanese catches of humpback and fin whales in the
Antarctic will occur in populations that are generally
believed to be below 54% of K, the minimum threshold
below which the RMP does not permit catches.
The article contends, ‘‘The group that is economically
most dependent on the whaling issue is ironically the
extreme anti-whaling NGOs such as Greenpeace’’. How-
ever, not all NGOs are green; there are several pro-whaling
groups that are just as embroiled in this controversy; and
there are more than enough other environmental problems
on which to base fund-raising campaigns. Furthermore, the
commercial reliance of the GOJ on a continuation of
whaling—currently in the form of scientific permit
catches—to keep their aging whaling fleet operational is
far more relevant in this context. Left to purely market
forces, this industry would likely die since Japan’s populace
has lost its taste for whale meat and there is currently a
growing mountain of unsold product being held in cold
storage [20]. Additionally, despite the GOJ’s rhetoric about
preserving ‘‘culturally significant’’ small-type coastal whal-
ing in Japan, most of the government’s resources go into
the Southern Ocean scientific whaling enterprise, the last
remnant of the old commercial factory ship operations that
drove many whale stocks to commercial extinction. As we
note below, access to high-seas fisheries resources is of
paramount importance to Japan.
In his section on politics, Morishita makes the statement
that the US brought up the whaling issue at a 1972 UN
conference to turn attention away from defoliation in
Vietnam, and supports the idea that this is ‘‘widely
believed’’ with a single citation which turns out to be a
pro-whaling editorial in the Japan Times newspaper.6 We
find it remarkable thatMarine Policy permitted this sort of
ARTICLE IN PRESS
3Abundance estimates of these same humpback whale populations on
their low-latitude breeding grounds to the north provide evidence for
lower and biologically plausible increase rates [15].
4ICR is a semi-governmental organization that conducts the research on
whales killed by Kyodo Senpaku Corporation; it is funded by the Fisheries
Agency of Japan. ICR is the permit holder for the two whaling research
programs; it lies within the jurisdiction of the Fisheries Agency, and its
director is a former official of the latter body.
5In a 2006 review, the SC agreed that the maximum plausible annual
rate of increase for humpback whales is 10.6% [18]; similar constraints
would also apply to fin whales. Despite this, from its scientific whaling
program data Japan has reported rates of increase as high as 18.1%
(CV ¼ 0.21) and 29.8% (CV ¼ 0.1) per annum for Antarctic humpback
and fin whales, respectively [19].
6The editorial was written by Mr. K. Yonezawa, who was the IWC
Commissioner for Japan from 1977 to 1984, after which he was hired as
the Senior Managing Director of Nippon Suisan Kaisha Ltd, the second
largest marine products company in Japan.
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statement and its attendant ‘‘citation’’ to appear in its
pages unchallenged.
In another example of selective information, Morishita
cites an opinion poll which purportedly found that 71% of
the US public ‘‘supported limited and controlled whaling’’,
and generalizes this to the broader statement that when the
public is ‘‘provided with objective information’’ (italics
ours), their views on whaling are not what the NGOs
would have us believe. As everyone knows, the answers one
gets in a poll depend in part upon the way in which
questions are phrased; the poll concerned is 10 years old
and its results are contradicted by other surveys which have
consistently found broad opposition to whaling among the
public in the United States and many other countries.
Indeed, a poll conducted in 2006 found opposition to
whaling among ten Pacific and Caribbean nations whose
governments have been paid by Japan to support its
position at the IWC [21].
Morishita accuses environmentalists of using scientific
uncertainty about whale stocks ‘‘as the basis for calls for
the prohibition of whaling.’’ Yet, despite mounting
evidence of declining populations, for years this uncer-
tainty was exploited by whaling nations to give the benefit
of the doubt to the whalers, with disastrous results. In this
light, the Moratorium can be seen as a tardy but
appropriately conservative response to the large-scale
failures of management and oversight which all but
extirpated some whale stocks, and brought some species
(such as Antarctic blue whales and Northern Hemisphere
right whales) perilously close to extinction.7 Uncertainty in
any data used for management is invariably a given in
science, and modern management models are careful to
define these uncertainties and to accommodate precaution
in the selection of an estimate from within the range of
possibilities. The IWC’s SC follows exactly such a process
in the RMP. Clearly, the lack of defensible and credible
ranges of abundance of many whale species remains a
cogent disqualifier of proposed management actions to
exploit those populations. Japan has been particularly
concerned about scientific uncertainty since the 1991
United Nations General Assembly global moratorium on
all large-scale high seas drift-net fishing, a ban which was
based largely upon the precautionary principle.
Among the major management failures of the past was
the absence of an International Observer Scheme (IOS)
until 1971, a problem which allowed widespread falsifica-
tion of whaling catch data. The most egregious example
was that of the former USSR, which is now known to have
killed well over 100,000 whales illegally in the years
1947–73 [23,24]; these illegal catches hastened the collapse
of some Southern Hemisphere baleen whale populations,
and almost extirpated the right whale in the eastern North
Pacific [25].8 Yet the Soviets were neither the only nor the
most recent example of such deception: Japan is known to
have falsified catch data on sperm and Bryde’s whales in its
coastal whaling operations [26,27]. For the latter species,
these catches occurred until at least 1987, i.e. the year after
the IWC Moratorium took effect. Additional details on the
extent of past falsification by Japan are currently unknown;
it is worth noting that (unlike Russia with the Soviet case)
Japan has yet to acknowledge that these falsifications
occurred. Furthermore, even after the IOS was instituted in
the Southern Hemisphere, Japanese inspectors aboard at
least one Soviet factory ship failed to report that the USSR
exceeded the IWC sperm whale quota in the 1971/72
Antarctic whaling season.
Morishita tells us that existing international and
domestic oversight procedures ‘‘are adequate to ensure
sustainable whaling’’ and that the Revised Management
Scheme (RMS)9 ‘‘has not been agreed by the IWC because
of delaying tactics of anti-whaling governments’’. Yet one
of the biggest delays in implementation of the RMS has
arisen from the refusal of Japan and other whaling nations
to accept true transparency in the monitoring of whaling.
Both Norway and Japan have established DNA databases
to archive reference material from legally killed whales as a
check on the origin of products found in the market.
However, both countries refuse to allow truly independent
oversight or third-party monitoring of such databases and
sampling schemes, and both take the position that market
oversight lies outside the jurisdiction of the IWC. Given the
quite recent history of duplicity by Japan and others in
catch reporting (and their dramatic parallels in illegal
fishing), it is not surprising that the ‘‘anti-whaling nations’’
view such recalcitrance with suspicion.
For many people in this debate, the issue is not that
some whales are not abundant, but that the whaling
industry cannot be trusted to regulate itself or to honestly
assess the status of potentially exploitable populations. It is
hard to trust a government agency which frequently serves
up nonsensical estimates of abundance and population
growth, which refuses to allow independent oversight of its
actions, and which pays lip service to the RMP while
simultaneously stating that the proper way to manage
whales is to cull them.
Throughout his article, Morishita portrays as irrational
or hostile any party disagreeing with the GOJ’s position.
The term ‘‘anti-whaling’’ appears no fewer than 33 times in
the article, tied to 14 other words (anti-whaling organiza-
tions, countries, campaign, interests, governments, move-
ment, NGOs, policy, views, side, values, interests,
ARTICLE IN PRESS
7The basis for the Moratorium is encapsulated in a statement made by
some scientists in the 1981 SC report: ‘‘Upon reviewing the breadth and
depth of uncertainties which existy not one whale stock assessment exists
which is free of the uncertainties described. We view this as untenable and
suggest that it is reasonable to consider developing and adopting
management regimes, including a cessation of whaling if necessary, which
decrease the risk of whaling in the face of such uncertainties.’’[22]
8Japan’s response to these revelations has been to publicly question the
integrity of the former Soviet biologists who (at considerable personal risk
within the Soviet system) meticulously documented these catches.
9The RMS includes the set of controls and inspection procedures to be
put in place should commercial whaling recommence.
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philosophy, and sentiments). In this view, those who agree
with the GOJ are reasonable, bona-fide scientists. In
contrast, anyone in the SC or elsewhere who takes a
contrary position is branded with any of a series of
derogatory terms; these include (to quote from various
parts of the article) emotional, unobjective, extreme,
preposterous, sensational, non-experts, fear of Japan, hostile
to Japan, Japan-bashers, manipulative, outrageous, unac-
ceptable, egocentric, brain-washed, and culturally imperia-
listic.
He rejects a priori the concept that many people oppose
a resumption of whaling today because they genuinely
believe that inadequate controls are in place to ensure that
it is truly sustainable. Similarly, Japan’s abuse of science to
justify escalating catches numbers, and the whaling
nations’ contention that whales (and other marine mam-
mals10) need to be culled [28], leave little room for good-
faith negotiations on responsible resource management.
These actions, and Norway’s recent announcement that it
is unilaterally modifying the RMP because it is ‘‘too
conservative’’ and gives catches that ‘‘are inappropriately
small’’ [29], do little to convince skeptics that the whalers
genuinely intend to manage whales in a way that will not
repeat the mistakes of the past. In other words, given the
recent history and statements of the industry, there is
reason enough to distrust current whaling practices with-
out ever needing to stray into issues of differing ethical
perspectives about the value of whales, or serious concerns
regarding the often protracted time to death of the whales
from harpooning.
On the surface, it is difficult to understand the tenacity
with which Japan clings to whaling in the face of so much
international opposition, or to comprehend the huge
expenditure of effort and resources that are currently
poured into the issue. As Morishita himself notes, whaling
is heavily subsidized by the GOJ, well beyond its potential
economic value for the near future. In addition, Japan
gives millions of dollars in aid and other support to
developing nations in exchange for their membership and
pro-Japan votes at the IWC. Whaling continues to ramp up
despite excessive supply of, and poor demand for, whale
meat [20,30]. Why then do they persist in this endeavor?
Three factors are in play on this issue. First, Japanese
domestic cultural values concerning whales are at odds
with the anti-whaling ‘‘norm’’ of the international political
arena [31]. Second, the control of all decision-making on
whaling policy by powerful pro-whaling government
agencies is hegemonistic in scope, and this has effectively
precluded anti-whaling advocates both inside and outside
Japan from exerting influence [31]. Powerful political
pressure from within Japan comes from special interest
groups, the fishing lobby, the Fisheries Agency and
numerous politicians who all want to defend what they
see as a right to secure unlimited access to global marine
resources [32]. As a recent review noted, ‘‘As long as
domestic cultural and political structures remain intact,
Japan’s pro-whaling policy will continue.’’ [31].
Finally, to understand the importance of whaling to
Japan, the issue must be seen not in isolation but in the
much broader context of international fisheries policy.
Concessions in other management fora could impact
whaling; indeed, strict inspection provisions are already
in place in some existing fisheries agreements, and the GOJ
is clearly resisting their inclusion in the RMS in an effort to
resume commercial whaling with as little restriction as
possible. But whaling itself represents a potentially slippery
slope: a major loss or concession on this issue could
potentially have severe ramifications for Japan’s extensive
and critically important fisheries agreements elsewhere.
Mr. Morishita himself inadvertently illustrated this
dilemma in an amusing incident which occurred at the
2001 IWC meeting in London. In an intervention at an SC
plenary session, he explained why he disliked a procedure
that had been suggested for managing Antarctic minke
whales, and concluded by saying that this was ‘‘a very bad
way to manage southern bluefin tuna.’’ After a pause in
which everyone in the room looked up quizzically, he
added, ‘‘Sorry-wrong meeting.’’ The slip said much about
the inextricable connection between whaling and other
fisheries issues for the GOJ, and the basic blueprint
underlying its approach to the management of a wide
range of exploited marine species.
For a nation that is as dependent upon fisheries
resources as Japan, this is a critical fight to win. Or to
modify the concluding statement of Morishita’s article:
Japan’s fisheries policy can’t be protected without whaling.
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